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1. The rationale of euthanasia as being punishable and the physician as not being punishable

One of the most complicated issues on the interface between criminal and health law is the termination of life upon request, i.e. euthanasia or assisted suicide. 
	The case of Mia Versluis, who was still young when she went into a coma after an operation under general anaesthetic in 1966 and died in 1971 without ever having recovered consciousness, led to widespread public debate in the Netherlands on the question of euthanasia. Two arguments were often presented in favour of euthanasia at the time, one stressing mercifulness and the other emphasizing the right to self-determination. Another two arguments were presented against euthanasia, one strongly backed by the Roman Catholic Church stressing the respect which all human life deserves, and the other emphasizing the danger of embarking on a slippery slope.​[1]​
	A female physician went on trial in 1973 for giving a fatal injection to her mother, who had repeatedly asked her to help her die because of her extremely poor physical condition. The court rejected the physician’s claim of duress in the sense of necessity. The physician stated that she had no other choice and there was nothing she could do but to help her mother. The court ruled, however, that a different subsidiary method, i.e. pain alleviation, should have been tried first. The judge did explicitly acknowledge the daughter’s integrity and the deep emotions involved, however.​[2]​ She was given a symbolic suspended sentence of one week in prison. 
	This court ruling marked the start of further legal developments in the Netherlands. There was gradually an acknowledgment in the case law of the principle of necessity as a legitimizing ground for the physician​[3]​ if certain conditions are met. In 2002 a legal ruling was ultimately formulated for the termination of life upon request and assisted suicide. Under certain circumstances, this ruling now allows the physician to carry out the required act. 
	The ruling is in the form of a special exemption from punishment for the physician himself, although ending a life on request and assisted suicide as such remain punishable by law. Ever since our Criminal Code entered into force in 1886, the point of departure has been that ending a life on request and assisted suicide are specially formulated crimes (carrying maximum prison sentences of, respectively, nine and three years) that can be viewed as less severe forms of manslaughter (which carries a maximum prison sentence of fifteen years). This differs from the situation in many other countries, where the ending of a life on request is subject to the same punishment as ending a life under any other circumstances. 
	The most important distinguishing criterion is the individual free will of the person involved. The fact that terminating a life on request and assisted suicide are nonetheless punishable by law is based on the underlying legal principle that needs to be protected, i.e. respect for human life, which also entails the interests of the community as a whole. If for no other reason, it is clear that the adage Volenti non fit iniuria (No injustice can be done to someone who wants it done) from Roman law does not have unlimited validity. The following concise definition of euthanasia was formulated at the time by H. J. J. Leenen: a deliberate life-terminating act by another person at the individual’s request.​[4]​ This definition pertains to the essence of euthanasia and does not cite further conditions under which this life-terminating act is or is not permissible. Leenen initially saw the right to autonomy as a basis for the permissibility of ending a life upon request and assisted suicide. He later changed this into a legal principle that, although indicative of a certain degree of autonomy, still does not mean that an individual can assert the right to have a physician carry out euthanasia. The well-considered request on the part of the individual involved has, however, remained decisive in drawing a distinction between manslaughter and murder. 

2. The legal ruling of 2002 and the meaning of the living will

The legal ruling pertaining to the ending of a life on request and assisted suicide went into effect in 2002. The physician who ends a life on request or assists in a suicide is obliged to inform the municipal coroner in a manner prescribed by law in the form of a statement drawn up in accordance with a model report,​[5]​ after which the municipal coroner sends the statement and report to the Regional Assessment Committee. Based on the report drawn up by the physician, this independent committee consisting of a lawyer, a physician and an ethics expert, primarily assesses whether the physician has adhered to the legal norms stipulated in Section 2 of the Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide Act referred to as due care criteria in the life-terminating act he has performed or the suicide in which he has assisted. If he has adhered to these norms, the committee views the termination of life on request or assisted suicide as being in keeping with the due care criteria and it informs the physician of this fact. Otherwise, after the physician is asked for further information on the act of euthanasia, the committee presents its assessment​[6]​ and sends it to the Board of Attorneys-General. This Board then considers the question of whether the act of euthanasia provides sufficient grounds for the criminal prosecution of the physician. Criminal procedures are not frequently initiated in cases of this kind. If the committee finds that the physician has acted with due care, he is exempted from criminal prosecution on the grounds of Section 293 Part 2 of the Criminal Code (containing a special ground for exemption from punishment). 
	The nature and significance of the above-mentioned due care criteria are very varied. So the physician has to be convinced that the patient is making a voluntary and well-considered request, there is no prospect of improvement and the patient’s suffering is unbearable. The patient has to be fully informed about his situation and he has to have concluded there is no other reasonable solution to his situation. Moreover, at least one independent physician has to be consulted and he has to have seen the patient. In addition, the termination of life on request or assisted suicide has to be carried out with the utmost medical care.
This ruling is solely intended for cases where a request has been expressed by the patient, since there are otherwise no grounds for using the term euthanasia (see Leenen’s definition). In cases of assisted suicide, the will of the patient is expressed in the act of suicide itself.
It is true that the patient’s written living will is called for in the model report to be filled out by the physician, but in order to meet the due care criteria, the physician has to be convinced that the patient is making a voluntary and well-considered request, which can also have been made orally. The fact remains that there is often a written statement as evidence, which is orally confirmed and sometimes reconfirmed by the patient at the request of the physician once the time for euthanasia has arrived. 
Faced with all this, we should not lose sight of the fact that the patient’s freedom to decide is only relative. After all, no human decision is absolutely free. The euthanasia decision has to be based on clear information provided by a physician, who has to listen carefully to the patient.​[7]​ The communication between the physician and patient is thus of vital importance. The introduction of SCEN physicians,​[8]​ who are specially trained to act as consultants in euthanasia requests, facilitates a responsible forming and formulation of a living will and good reporting on the entire concrete course of events. 
Another aspect of the euthanasia decision can be the patient’s youth. The law now has the following provision: The parents of a minor between the ages of twelve and sixteen have to consent to the decision and the parents of a patient between the ages of sixteen and eighteen have to be involved in the decision before euthanasia can be performed (Section 2, Parts 3 and 4, Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide Act).
There are cases where the emphatic request requirement can lead to a dilemma for the Assessment Committee, i.e. in the event that on the grounds of the statement by the physician, there is serious reason to doubt the existence of a request that has been freely made, for example due to an apparent inconsistency in the patient’s statements or if and when the patient appears to have made these statements under pressure from people around him. In this case, the Assessment Committee might well draw the conclusion that the due care criteria regarding the freely made living will not have been met. At the same time, however, the due care criteria touch upon the very heart of the definition of euthanasia. If the Assessment Committee feels that, for the reasons referred to above, one cannot reasonably speak of a request in the sense of the law, it can return the case to the municipal coroner with the conclusion that it is not essentially a case of euthanasia, but might well be a case of murder or manslaughter. However, I am speaking here of borderline cases.
A living will cannot be viewed as permission for medical acts as required in the Medical Treatment Agreement Act, since the acts related to euthanasia are not classified under medical acts in the sense of medical law, but are solely classified as acts performed by a physician. This is not only in line with the reasoning on the nature and purport of the acts in question; it was stipulated in so many words by the Supreme Court in 1986.​[9]​ This view on the carrying out of euthanasia served as grounds for the Supreme Court ruling that a physician cannot claim a medical exception (in the sense of a medical intervention and thus ex lege artis) in the case of euthanasia. It is consequently not feasible to automatically classify a living will as ‘consent to an intervention in the health field’ in the sense of Section 5, nor can it be classified as ‘previously expressed wishes relating to a medical intervention’ in the sense of Section 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, at any rate if this intervention is related to a medical act, which is probably the case, since there does not seem to be much of a possibility that anyone was thinking of euthanasia or even wanted to do so within the framework of this Convention. 
In this connection there is nonetheless the question of more or less parallel situations, especially since Section 9 of the Convention is not restricted to prior statements pertaining to a refusal of treatment but also concerns statements that can contain prior permission.​[10]​ 
In health law, living wills pertaining to the refusal of certain kinds of medical treatment are automatically valid and have to be completely respected by physicians. 

3. Various situations in which there is no valid recent living will 

The living will that by law contains a voluntary and well-considered request can, however, still be problematic if the individual is unable or no longer able to independently determine and express his own will. This can occur if:
(a)	there is no recent living will, but there is one that was drawn up in the not so distant past
(b) 	there is no living will although the individual was capable of drawing one up in the past
(c)	there is no living will at all and the individual was never capable of drawing one up
(d)	there is a living will, but there are things that are wrong with it so that its validity is in doubt. 

ad (a)
Despite the reservations cited above as regards the range of the Convention, our euthanasia legislation would seem to be in agreement with the spirit of Section 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. After all, Section 2 Part 2 of the Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide Act explicitly makes it possible - in the event that a patient above the age of sixteen who is no longer able to express his will, but was considered to be able to arrive at a reasonable consideration of his interests before he was in his present condition, and has signed a written statement with a request for the termination of his life -for the physician to comply with this request. Section 9 of the Convention also has to be viewed in the broader perspective of patients’ rights and their prudent interpretation.​[11]​ 
With respect to Section 9 of the Convention, the explanatory report (Section 62) notes that ‘taking previously expressed wishes into account does not mean they should necessarily be followed. For example, if the wishes were expressed a long time before the intervention and science has since progressed, there may be grounds for not heeding the patient’s opinion. As far as possible, the physician should be satisfied that the patient’s wishes apply to the present situation and are still valid, taking technical progress in medicine into account.’
The progress of science can indeed also affect the interpretation of a living will which was drafted a long time previously. For example, sedative and palliative methods have improved. An unexpected change in the patient’s condition can also serve as grounds for a different judgment as regards euthanasia than the patient probably imagined in the first instance. In the case of a patient who is no longer able to express his will, for example because he is in a coma, the fact that there is no prospect of improvement and the suffering is unbearable might still be as valid as ever. If a patient is in a coma and is no longer capable of communication in any form, very precise attention needs to be devoted to the degree of actual suffering at the moment of the proposed euthanasia. This is not always easy to determine.
A patient who had been treated for cancer for years asked his physician to carry out euthanasia and repeated the request on various occasions, sometimes in the presence of his children. If euthanasia was not carried out, his physician did not expect him to live longer than a few days. The independent physician who was to serve as a consultant arrived just as the patient was unfortunately going into a deep coma. The consultant discussed the patient’s condition with his children, who informed him that it was their father’s deepest wish not to have to experience the same kind of humiliating situation that his wife, their mother, had gone through several years earlier when she had suffered from a serious carcinoma. Her suffering and death had been a traumatic experience for the patient and his children. The children now felt that their father’s suffering could only be terminated by means of euthanasia. The consultant surmised, however, that now that their father was in a coma, he was no longer suffering. The children were extremely disappointed and angry because they felt that the situation was very different to what their father had wanted. Although it was true that there was no prospect of improvement, the consultant continued to be of the opinion that since the patient was in a coma, the suffering was not unbearable and one of the due care criteria for admissible euthanasia had thus not been met. 
However, the patient’s own physician was still faced with a serious dilemma for several days. When he observed a few days later that the patient’s breathing was still regular and his pulse still strong, he nonetheless decided to carry out euthanasia. In his own words, he did so solely because the patient’s children were not willing to accept the situation of his being in a coma and unlike the physicians, they were convinced that their father was suffering. 
The Assessment Committee stated as regards this case that euthanasia should not be performed on a comatose patient who does not exhibit any signs of suffering even if there is little or no chance of a partial or complete recovery. Although the Committee could understand the physician’s dilemma and was convinced that he was acting with a clear conscience, the Committee nevertheless felt that he should have waited for the patient to die a natural death, which would probably have happened within a matter of days. The physician had thus failed to adhere to the due care criteria. In keeping with the instructions applicable to this case, this judgment was submitted to the Attorneys-General and the Health Care Inspectorate.​[12]​
This case illustrates that an earlier living will is secondary to new developments in the patient’s condition which affect the evaluation of the situation as a whole. It is not that it is possible to anticipate these developments in a living will, since no one automatically has a right to euthanasia just because they are in a coma. It depends, after all, on whether they are suffering in this situation, which will have to be determined by the physician or physicians on the spot and assessed on the basis of observable signs.

ad (b)
A person can come to be in a condition of reduced mental capability, perhaps even very abruptly, and be unable to make and express end of life decisions in a reasonable fashion, without having drawn up a living will when his mind was still healthy. This is conceivable in the case of people suffering from increasing dementia due to old age or a serious illness or persons in a coma. 
	A desire to end one’s life usually emerges in the course of a patient’s illness. In many cases, the patient’s ability to express his own wishes is not something his physician has any doubts about. The physician does however have to be convinced that the patient’s wishes have been formulated in a well-considered fashion on the basis of his full mental capacities and his own free will. In consulting the patient about the approaching end of his life, the physician will assess the patient’s wishes in this connection and the options he himself has for meeting these wishes. During this consultation, varying degrees of doubt can however arise in the physician’s mind concerning the patient’s ability to make a decision. In the case of an Alzheimer patient who the physician felt was suffering unbearably because of his inability to function independently in any way and the prospect of deterioration and a loss of decorum in the future, the consulting physician disagreed with the patient’s own physician and doubted the patient’s ability to make a well-considered decision, even though he had consistently submitted end of life requests over a lengthy period of time. The consulting physician observed, however, that during the consultations, the patient was unable to follow a line of reasoning. In addition, the consulting physician, once again in disagreement with the patient’s own physician, concluded that the unbearable suffering would be reduced as the disease progressed, since the patient would become less aware of his own shortcomings.
	The patient’s physician then consulted another three experts, including a psychologist and a geronto-psychiatrist. Each of them arrived independently at the conclusion that the patient was not suffering from depression, that the patient wished to retain control over his own life, and that a voluntary and well-considered request had indeed been made.
	The patient’s physician felt there were adequate grounds for euthanasia. Confronted with the contradictory opinions of the consulting physician and the experts who were later consulted, the Assessment Committee was of the opinion that, based on his own judgment, the patient’s physician had rightly attributed more significance to the judgment of the experts who were later consulted. The conclusion was thus drawn that the patient’s physician had acted in accordance with the due care criteria.​[13]​
	In a number of other cases though, there can be little or no doubt as to the patient’s inability to make well-considered decisions. This is why four reports were published in 1989 on various categories of patients unable to make well-considered decisions. They were the result of the efforts of a Committee on the Acceptability of Life-Terminating Acts appointed by the Royal Dutch Society for the Promotion of Medicine.​[14]​ Traces of the due care criteria as regards euthanasia can sometimes be detected in these reports, for example as regards patients who have been in a coma for a lengthy period of time.​[15]​ In the case of, for example, severely demented patients, references are sometimes made to a presumed will if and when there is no doubt at all as to the accuracy of this reconstruction.​[16]​
	The dilemmas that can arise in a situation of this kind are illustrated by the commotion in March 2005 in the United States surrounding the removal of the life-sustaining feeding tube in the case of Terry Schiavo, incapacitated by a heart attack fifteen years earlier, whose husband had been trying for years to allow her life to be terminated but whose parents were opposed, believing as they did in the possibility of her recovery. The husband stated that his wife had told him she would never want to be kept alive in a vegetative state, and her parents claimed that he just wanted to marry another woman.​[17]​ Not that I think there is anything wrong in this, in view of the negligible chance of the patient ever coming out of her coma. The Court overruled a special emergency law applicable to this specific case urging the judge to reconsider, and allowed her husband to have Terry Schiavo’s feeding tube removed.
In a vegetative state, it is somewhat misleading if a patient’s facial expression changes or his eyes move, without there being any real vital human function in effect. In cases of this kind, feeding the patient through a tube is considered a medical act, which can be halted in the Netherlands on the grounds of its senseless nature. This is a condition that can result from a coma, and since the way to life is cut off, as is the way to death, ethical dilemmas can arise. This explains why this condition goes on for an average of six years in the Netherlands. Even though the patient’s physicians are competent to make decisions on whether medical acts are senseless, the patient’s family can have a point of view that the physician does not want to overlook or ignore. The patient’s quality of life is not an issue that should be primarily decided upon by the physician. Moreover, the physician can be confronted with a living will that the patient signed at an earlier point in time and is now applicable to the situation. 
The Terri Schiavo case bears a certain similarity to the Stinissen case that came to an end in the Netherlands in 1990. Ms Stinissen had been in a coma for thirteen years and her husband had been trying for some time to have her life ended. Initially the Office of the Public Prosecutor refused to issue a statement that it would not prosecute a physician who ended her life in accordance with the due care criteria. Then the husband tried to get the Court to classify feeding his wife through a tube as a senseless medical act, but the judge ruled that this was not a legal issue, but a question that should be answered by the physician himself based on the ethical standards of the medical profession. The Court also ruled that there was no way of knowing what the patient herself would have decided in the situation she was now in. The patient’s physician thereby decided to remove the life-sustaining feeding tube and the patient died in January 1990. The Office of the Public Prosecutor did not prosecute the physician because this was a case of a medical act and he had acted in accordance with the due care criteria.​[18]​
It is clear that in cases of this kind, the individual wish of a patient recorded in a living will does not have much legal significance, since it is the senselessness of the medical act that is of decisive importance. This pertains a fortiori to a presumed will, irrespective of the good grounds on which it might be based. 
Lastly, there is another kind of case where the absence of a living will that could have been in existence is essential to how the physician is to proceed. This concerns patients who, due to their suffering, have suddenly become unapproachable after failing to express their wishes about their life or death. 




One group of persons who are never able to formulate and express their wishes is the category of severely handicapped newborn infants. In 1989 the Supreme Court ruled on the actions of a physician who did not perform an operation on Baby Ross who had been born with Down’s syndrome and a closure of the stomach and duodenum. With the permission of his parents, the physician terminated the medical treatment so that Baby Ross died. One of the experts made a statement to the effect that the prospects for the parents and child were ‘horrific’. The Court rightly ruled that the physician should not be prosecuted for murder.​[20]​
	In the Prins case and the Kadijk case (both in 1995) the Court then ruled that ending the lives of severely handicapped newborn infants who could not be treated, had extremely poor prospects and were suffering a great deal of pain was similarly justified (by the claim of necessity). 
	It is important to note that in the Kadijk case, the Court explicitly stated that the parents did not have a power of decision that went so far as to justify their deciding to terminate the life of their child. Euthanasia cannot, after all, include terminating the life of a person unable to speak for himself, even if it is carried out on the explicit request of the parents.
	Several physicians in Groningen have since drawn up a protocol for this category of newborn infants and in the past seven years, twenty-two cases in which physicians had acted in accordance with the rules have been dismissed by the Office of the Public Prosecutor.​[21]​ All this serves to illustrate once again that there is good reason to consider the initial plan of appointing a separate multidisciplinary assessment committee as soon as possible, parallel to the Regional Assessment Committees now in operation (see Section 5). It would address all the cases of life termination where there is no living will, but which under certain circumstances would nonetheless be reasonably justified. 

ad (d)
As noted above, there are sometimes doubts about whether a request is totally voluntary and well considered. This might especially be the case with patients whose specific psychological condition seems to be largely responsible for the request, which the individual would otherwise probably not have made. This is the underlying reason for the extra requirement stipulated by the Supreme Court in the Chabot decree​[22]​ pertaining to a woman with no somatic illness or serious psychiatric syndrome who submitted an urgent request to Dr Chabot, a psychiatrist, to help her terminate her life. She was in a state of depression in a narrow sense of the term after her two sons had died, one soon after the other, an event which she experienced as traumatic. She was completely convinced that she was never going to be able to get over their deaths and that the rest of her life was going to be a black hole without a moment of happiness. The psychiatrist repeatedly examined the issue of whether her wish to die was authentic and well considered and after consulting six experts from various disciplines, he gave her the assistance which she requested. The Supreme Court approved of how he had adhered to the due care criteria except in one aspect: Since there were such serious psychological factors involved and in view of the utmost caution called for in assessing whether the request had been made voluntarily, at least one of the consulting experts should have personally met the woman in question. The Supreme Court did not exclude the possibility that an autonomous free will can underlie the wish to die on the part of people suffering psychological pain. 
	Improper pressure, for example from relatives, can also affect what the patient claims to want. One reprehensible example is a man who tried to convince his mother, who was at a nursing home, to end her life because it would suit his plans for a holiday. In arriving at his own conclusion in such a case , the physician who is aware that a patient is being influenced in any way in reaching an end of life decision will have to make this a serious part of his considerations. 

4. Euthanasia and sedation

Terminal sedation is another issue entirely. The difference between sedation and euthanasia is that sedation is a medical act focused on alleviating suffering via painkillers and palliative care, possibly leading to the patient dying sooner, whereas euthanasia is not a medical act. It is consequently only the physician who is in a position to make decisions about sedation. Scientific studies have shown that in approximately half the cases involving terminal sedation, the matter of euthanasia is also referred to in the decision-making and that in 14% of the cases, the patient himself prefers terminal sedation to euthanasia.​[23]​ 
	It is not surprising that the distinction between euthanasia and terminal sedation should create a grey area where the intention of the physician is essentially decisive: Is it his intention to allow the patient to die? Or, primarily, to alleviate the pain? Of course it is only plausible that his intention is to relieve the pain if the painkiller dosages are below a certain level. In its 1990 report, the Remmelink Committee referred to this as giving ‘the last push’ in ‘desperate cases’ and it spoke of ‘care for the dying’.​[24]​ This pertained at the time to approximately a thousand cases a year, where this kind of care for the dying essentially led to life termination without a request. There are nonetheless widely divergent interpretations of what this does or does not cover. In 2002 the Chairman of the Board of Attorneys-General even suggested that terminal sedation leading to an earlier death should be included within the regime of euthanasia. 




A voluntary and well-considered request is part and parcel of the euthanasia process. The request should preferably be formulated in a written statement. At the moment when the euthanasia or assisted suicide is to be carried out, the patient should at least be asked to confirm that this is what he wants. In the event that the patient is no longer able to express his wishes, the law permits the physician to act on the grounds of a statement made in the past. If an authorized representative has been appointed in writing, he cannot independently give his permission for euthanasia to be carried out without there being a living will. All he can do is formulate or help to formulate a further interpretation of an existing living will.​[28]​  
	In practice, the relatives of a dying patient often suggest what the patient would have wanted. Their suggestions do not have autonomous significance; at most, they can have advisory or supportive value and the physician must definitely not give in to whatever pressure certain members of a patient’s family might exert if he feels that euthanasia is not justifiable. Psychological duress on the part of the physician is not acknowledged, since according to his profession he is expected to be able to adequately resist whatever pressure is put on him. Globally speaking, the new Dutch legislation seems to embody the same rules on the living will as the European convention on medical acts in general. 
Years ago, the imminent arrival was announced of a special assessment committee to address various end of life situations where there is no euthanasia request in cases of coma patients, severely handicapped newborn infants and so forth, but up to now no such committee has been appointed. From the criminal law perspective, however, I feel that it is indefensible that, time and again, comparable situations are judged by a criminal court on the basis of duress criteria (necessity) that are solely intended to apply to acute emergency situations. The appointment of a committee of this kind can, however, be viewed as an infringement of Section 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which strictly prohibits the deliberate termination of a person’s life without his request,​[29]​ as well as Section 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which gives the citizen the right to a national statutory remedy against the violation of the rights guaranteed in the Convention. As a compromise, it might still be feasible to appoint a committee of experts who only make recommendations to the Office of the Public Prosecutor. This has been propagated at any rate for end of life decisions in the case of severely handicapped newborn infants.​[30]​ Other gaps such as terminal sedation situations might yet be subject to further regulation in the form of guidelines. 
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